ARSTRACTS OF RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

the case, by reason of not taking into the account the influence of
other principles, concerning which, being ignorant of their existence, he could make no calculation.
Some men have minds so constituted by nature, that, they are
wholly unable to see the force, or even the existence, of any single
legal principle, much less to understand the combined action of
many. Such men are out of place in the profession of the law,
though they may have high capacity for some other calling.. But
other men who discern principles clearly, and reason well upon
them, commit errors, as we have just intimated, from not having
learned all the principles, or, what is equally common, from a failure to call some of them up when wanted. Now these persons are
usually very confident of their conclusions; they feel, in fact, certain; until age and experience have taught them the use of caution.
And here we see howy modesty enlarges with true knowledge.
Standing on a little point of some bay in the ocean of truth, far
inland, the untaught dspirant for the fordcastle pictures not to his
vision the mighty billows and waters, apparently enclosed by no
land, that roll beyond.
Whatever view we take of the subject discussed in this series of
articles, it lifts itself, in importance, above almost all other subjects
connected with legal science. And all persons must admit that it
is too little understood. He who has thoroughly mastered the elementary principles of the law, will keadily learn the rest from his
text books and digests, as' cases arise in practice ; while he who
understands not the principles, will stumble at every step, whatever
other legal knowledge he may possess.
J.P. B.
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Action-Malicious Prosecution.-An action for falsely and maliciously
procuring the plaintiff to be adjudged a bankrupt, maybe maintained, though

the affidavit before the Commissioner of Bankruptcy did not show an act
of bankruptcy, and the Commissioner made a mistake in point of law in
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adjudging plaintiff to be a bankrupt. Farl.e vs. Banks, 19 Jurist, 31,
Queen's Bench.
Admiralty-ForegnLaw-4ipping,Lien of Master.-The adoption
of the law of a foreign country, as in the case of a law giving the master a
lien for his wages, is discretionary with a Court of Admiralty, and not to
be resorted to where it would operate with injustice. The Johannes Christeph, 19 Jurist, 192. Court of Admiralty.
Common Carrier- Carrier'sAct.-The enactment in the Carrier's Act
of 11 Geo. 4, and 1 Will. 4, c. 68, that no common carrier by land, for
hire, shall be liable for the "loss" of certain descriptions of articles above
the value of £10, unless delivered as such,'and an increased charge for
carriage paid or accepted, must be understood with reference to a loss of
by the carrier;"such as by the abstraction by a stranger or
the article ",
by his own servants, not amounting to a felonious act, or by the carrier or
his servants losing them from vehicles in the course of carriage, or by
mislaying them, so that it was not known where to find them when they
ought to be delivered, &c., and does not extend to every.loss of any description whatever, occasioned "to the owner" of the article by the nondelivery, or by the delay of the delivery of it, by the neglect of the carrier
or his servants. Qumre, whether the loss spoken of in this section mustbe
a permanent or may be only a temporary loss. Hearnvs. -TheLondon and
S. f'. R. R. Co., 19 Jurist, 287. Exchequer.
Poor-Jwtice---Apprentice.-The assent by justices to the binding of
a child, under the 43 Elizabeth, is a judicial act, and must therefore show
on its face, that the justices were at the time acting within the local limits
of their jurisdiction. Where, consequently, the justices in their assent
described themselves as justices "for the county." Reld, that the assent
was bad, and no settlement gained under the indenture. Overseersof Staverton vs. Overseers of Ashburton, 19 Jur. 233. Queen's Bench.
Powers.-Where a general power to appoint had been exercised as to a
portion of the fund subject to it, but not as to the other part, and the deed
exercising the appointment reserved a power of revocation and new appointment over the p6rtion of the fund appointed, it was held that general words
in a subsequent deed of appointment executed by the same appointor)
purporting to exercise all powers of appointment given or limited to him,
or under or by virtue of which he had power to appoint, did not operate
as an exercise of the power of revocation of the appointment of the portion
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of the fund already appointed, but only of the power to appoint the portion
still remaining unappointed. Pomfret vs. Perring, 19 Jur. 173. Court
of Appeal in Chancery.
-Power-Revocation and NaTo Appointment.-By law, a power which,

in any mode and to any extent, has been exercised revocably, and the revocable appointment made under which has been revoked, without being
operated upon, is generally, if not universally, of the same force, and exercisable in the same manner as if the revoked appointment had not existed;
and a power cannot be necessarily exhausted by a revocable act, although
exercising other*ise the power to the utmost, more than by a conditional
act, or by an act of merely partial execution--i e. of execution in no sense
and in no possibility full and complete. Evans vs. Saunders, 19 Jur. 265.
Court of Appeal in Chancery.
A power to appoint by deed or will does not constitute two separate and
distinct powers, but is a single power, with a restriction on its exercise,
requiring it to be exercised by one or other of those two instruments, but
leaving to the donee the option, within the limits of that restriction, to
choose which instrument he will use in exercising the power. .1d.
Where, by the terms of the xeservation of powers of revocation and new
appointment, the donee is authorized to exercise them, at his option, either
by the same or by different deeds, if he first exercises by deed the poiver
If revocation, the power of new appointment continues to subsist as a valid
operative power, capable of being exercised by a subsequent deed; and
admitting that it is as competent to the donee of such powers, exercising
only the power of revocation, to release, extinguish, or destroy the power
of appointment which was reserved to him, yet the mere exercise of the
power of revocation as above will not per se have any such effect. Id.
Where a person has a general power of appointment by deed, whether
it is a primary power, (i. e. a power preceding the uses declared in default
of appointment,) or be a power of appointment connected with a power of
revocation, and following the uses declared by the instrument creating the
power, and exercises that power of appointment, and by the deed exercising
that power reserves to himself a new power of appointment, whiether such
new power be reserved as a primary power, or as connected with a power
of revocation, such power so reserved is, to all intents and purposes, a new
power, newly created by him, and is not the old power which he has exercised; and it is equally anew power, whatever the kind or degree of restriction which he has thought fit to impose on its exercise-4. e. whether such
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restriction be precisely the same in kind and degree as that iniposed oti the
old power, or be-greater or less in kind or degree. Id.
A general power of appointment over the fee will not be exhausted by
an appointment to uses exhausting the fee, but reserving a'power of revocation. "Id.
/
Where a general power of appointment by deed or will has been exercised by an appointment by deed, reserving a power of revocation and appointment to new uses to be exercised by deed only, the creation of this
last power to appoint by deed only cannot, without clear evidence of intention, be taken as operating to destroy the original power to appoiht by deed
or will;. and, semble, that if it is to be taken at all affecting such original
power, it is to be considered merely as in substitution of that branch of
the original power which it purports to replace, namely, the power to appoint by deed, Id.
Semble, that two general powers of appointment in fee can exiit in the
same person at the same time. Id.
Wil-Pecatoy (aritable " -usT.-Where on the face of a will there
is nothing to show that any trust or purpose was intended by the testator,
other than a gift of the whole beneficial interest to the legatee, the plaintiffs,
im order to.succeed in setting the bequest aside, must prove by evidence a
trust expressed, or such an engagemeit, by words or by silence, as will'
authorize the Court to say that the legatee undertook to do thatwhich the
law prevented the testator from imposing upon her-an express trust to
devote the residue to an illegal charitable purpose. Lomax vs. Ripkey,
19. Jar. 272. V. Ch. Stuart.
Where the evidence, parol and documentary, merely proves the wishes
and intentions of the testator, and that he refrained by instruction and
piemeditation from declaring any trust, or imposing any obligation, or exacting any promise from their fulfilment from the legatee, and also that the
legatee was, from the impulses of her own mind and disposition, bent on
fulfilling the testator's wishes and intentions if she had the power, it falls
short of what is required to establish the existence of any secret or honorary trust, the performance of which could be compelled on the footing of
the breach of a promise or engagement which would have been binding on.
the conscience. Id.
Where a gift is in terms absolute, but accompanied with an expression
of wishes in favor of another object, and a confidence in the honor and
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justice of the legatee, unless the language is so express as to be in terms
imperative, and to exclude all option or discretion, they cannot bind the
legatee or create a trust. Id.
Will-Attestation by a Legatee.-A testator by his will gave a legacy;
ield,
he afterwards made a codicil, which was attested by the legatee.
that this did not affect the legacy. Gurney vs. Gurney, 19 Jurist, 298.
V. Oh. Kindersley.
Shipping-Freight.--A cargo of wheat was shipped at a foreign port
to be brought t9 the United Kingdom., The shipment took place when
the vdssel was in quarantine, in an open roadstead, and was made out of
barges. The bill of lading was in the ordinary'English form, signed by
the master, the material part being as follows :-" Shipped, &c., in and
upon the Prompt, whereof, &c., and now riding at anchor at Odessa, and
bound fdr the United Kingdom, 3700 chetworths of wheat in bulk, "tobe
delivered, &c., at the port of destination, (the act of God, &c., and every
other danger of the seas, &c., excepted,) unto, &c., or their assignees, paying freight for the goods as per charter-party." By a memorandum in
the bill of lading, the guantity aud guaZity was declared to be unknown,
to the master. The provision in the charter-party, as to the freight of
wheat, was, that it was to be according to the London-Baltic printed rates,
which is a certain well known rate per quarter. The ship with the cargo
arrived at Gloucester, and the wheat, on being accepted by the assignee of
the bill of lading, was found to have increased in bulk by an admixture
of water during the voyage, but there was no evidence to show from what
cause this arose, or proof of any cutom or usage relative to the payment
of freight under such circumstances. Beld, that freight was payable for
the wheat according to its bulk at the time of loading, and not according
to its bulk at the time of its delivery. Gibson vs. ,Sturge, 19 Jurist, 259.
Exchequer. Martin, B., diss.
Shipping-RegistryActs.-The Court of Chancery cannot entertain the
question, whether a ship was properly registered, but must take the registration as conclusive. Combs vs. Mansfield, 19 Jur. 271. V.. Oh. Kindersley.
The Court will not relieve against the operation of the Ship Registry
Acts, on the ground of equitable fraud or of notice. Id.

